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EDITORIAL.
DECLINE OF THE JURY SYSTEM.
Everything human is in a state of flux.
The most cherished institutions are unable
to escape mutation and decay. Every constitution of Pennsylvania has in substance
contained the declaration of that of 1874 ;
"Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and
the right thereof remain inviolate." The
Federal constitution equally explicitly ordains the maintenance of the right of
trial by jury.
Despite these solemn enunciations, trial
byjury has suffered aserious invasion. Two
forms of the attack on it will here be noticed.
In the first place, there has been a constant
expansion of what is called equity jurisdiction so that many rights formerly asserted in law courts acting through juries,
are now administered by courts sitting as
equity courts, and deciding controversies
without the aid of juries. Any philosophical lawyer who surveys the history of the
jurisprudence of this state, will be struck
with the wonderful increase in the ratio of
cases now adjudicated by the chancellor
to those in which the twelve triers sit
as assessors with the court.
In the second place, there is a constant
narrowing of the sphere of the deciding
power of the jury, even in cases yet nominally submitted to them. Compulsory
non-suits on the one hand, and binding
instructions on the other, are becoming
phenomenally frequent. There is, on the
part of judges, an ever lessening confi-

dence in the judgment or integrity of
juries, and an ever diminishing willingness
to defer to it. Questions whose determinati6n was formerly left to juries, are now
decided by the courts. The rule that it is
negligence per se for one about to cross a
railroad tract not to stop, look and listen,
is of comparatively recent invention. The
opinion of thejudge concerning the reasonableness of the time taken for the doing
of an act, is often imposed on the jury,
whereas formerly it was allowed to exercise an untramelled judgment.
Until recently, the appraisement of the
credibility of witnesses was regarded as the
peculiar and inviolable prerogative of
juries. They might believe one witness
and disbelieve two or four, or six witnesses
contradictory of him. Within the last
eighteen months, the Supreme Court of the
state has determined that if the plaintiff
testifies to a fact, and five witnesses testify contrariwise, the jury must believe the
five and disbelieve the one.
It is not our purpose to express any
opinion concerning the desirability of
withdrawing from juries portions of their
ancientjurisdiction. We simply call attention to the silent and gradual erosion of an
institution on which the resources of
panegyric have been exhausted, and whose
inviolable perpetuation has been the declared purpose of laws and constitutions.
Against the forces of human life and society, the stateliest ordinances of a defunct
generation, though expressed in documents
around which the aureole of sanctity is
shed, are nugatory.
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A feature which we propose to inaugurate at an early date is the review of legal
publications of every description. All
books, etc., sent to us will be impartially
reviewed by a competent authority.

THE ALUMNI.
J. Harris Curran, Esq., '96, is professor
of mathematics in the Tome Institute, of
Port Deposit, Md. Mr. Curran is an editor of the Institute monthly, the first
number of which was recently issued. He
is succeeding admirably at the school,
where he is very highly regarded.

W. F. Shean, Esq., '96, of Scranton,
called on friends in Carlisle during February.
M. T. Dixon, Esq., '96, of Wilkes-Barre,
piloted a party of school directors through
the Indian School early in February.
They came from Harrisburg, where the
directors attended an educational meeting.
Mr. Dixon is meeting with good success
in the Luzerne county court.

Grant W. Nitrauer, '9.5, is enjoying a
lucrative practice in Lebanon. He is
prominently identified with the National
Building and Loan Association.

William H. Deweese, Esq., '93, since his
graduation at Dickinson, has been engaged
in the active practice of law at Denton,
Md. In December, '93, he was appointed
counsel to the County Commissioners of the
county, which place he held until January,
'96, at which time his term of office as
State's Attorney began. He was elected
to the latter position at the November, '95,
election. He was elected president of the
Town Council in April, '94, andserved in
that capacity until his term as State's Attdrney began,when he was forced to resign,
as one cannot hold two elective offices at
the same time in that state. In August,'95,
he formed a partnership with Fred R.
Owens, Esq., for the practice of law. His
expectations have been more than reached,
so therefore he has no reason to complain.
In December, '93, he became a benedict.

Oscar C. Clark, Esq., '93, is getting along
very well at Denton, Md. He enjoys a
good practice and ranks up high with the
young members of the bar. He succeeded
W. H. Deweese, Esq., as counsel to the
County Commissioners and is giving complete satisfaction. He has the entire confidence of all that know him.

Andrew J. Lynch, '93, has settled at
Georgetown, Del. In addition to success
in the law field, he has entered journalistic circles and is one of the editors and
proprietors of the Sussex Journal, published in Sussex county, Del.

Joseph H. Jones, '94, has his office in
Glover's Bloc]k, West Broad St., Hazletou,
Pa., where he has an extensive and lucrative practice. He is active in Republican
politics and is spoken of as a very formidable candidate for the office of District
Attorney next year.

Oliver W. Payran, '93, is located at
Atlantic City. After leaving Dickinson,
he was admited to the bar of New Jersey,
and he immediately began practice in
Atlantic City, locating in the Real Estate
.and Law Building. He has two large
offices nd a well equipped library. He
has been successful, having had several
importait cases in the Supreme Court decided in his favor. He writes that he
"will always prize the thorough course in
the Dickinson School of Law under Dr.
Trickett."
Lewis S. Sadler, '96, is associated in the
practice of his profession, with his father,
the Hon. IV. F. Sadler. His prospects are
very bright. He was recently elected
borough solicitor, and is the youngest attorney who has held the office in Carlisle.

Issa Tanimura, '92, is at present manager of a firm engaged in the raw silk
trade&at Kobe, Japan. Many of the
alumni will remember Mr. Tanimura and
the Japanese Carnival given four years
ago under his direction, the proceeds of
w'hich were used in the purchase of a
large number of books for the library.
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Chester C. Bashore, '95, soon after
graduation opened an office in Carlisle and
by his industry has succeeded in getting
a considerable clientage. He was recently
elected attorney to the County Commissioners.

George Points, '96, is serving a term as
solicitor to the town council of Bedford,
Pa. He is acquiring a good office practice.

H. D. Carey, '96, is located at Jermyn,
Pa. He is making a specialty of collections and real estate. He has already
acquired a large office practice, and his
prospects are very favorable.

Dr. Reed, president of the College and
the Law School, gave an address before
the Y. M1.C. A. convention, at Reading,
and responded to a toast of Dickinson
Alumni in New York, last month.

Joshua W. Swartz, '92, one of the rising
young attorneys of Harrisburg, spent a
short time in Carlisle recently and called
on some of the members of the faculty.
He is concerned .in several very important
cases at present.
Edwin F. Brightbill, '96, has attained
great- prominence as a lecturer. He recently delivered his very popular lecture
on "Condensed Cream-With Directions,"
before the largest audience ever assembled
at the Allentown College for Women,
Allentown, Pa. The DailyLeader,of that
city, commenting on the lecture, among
many other complimentary remarks,
stated: "It is safe to say that no better
pleased audience in Allentown ever
wended their way to their homes than
the one that Edwin F. Brightbill, Esq.,
entertained last evening. Should he ever
return to lecture in this city he will be
sure of a large and appreciative audience."
Mr. Brightbill has a large number of engagements.
C. Grant Cleaver, '95, is the principal
of the Milton High School.
Robert Eldon, '96, is engaged in educational work, having been elected principal
of the Lock Haven High School inSeptember, '96, for a term of two years.

THE SCHOOL.

J. H. O'Brien, of Avoca, entered the
Junior class last month.
The Junior class organization is as follows: President, Sylvester B. Sadler; VicePresident, Paul J. Schmidt; Secretary,
Charles E. Daniels; Treasurer, J. B.
Thompson Caldwell; Historian, E. S.
Livingood; Sergeant-at-arms, G. Frank
Wetzel; Executive Committee, C. N.
Berntheizel, Fred B. Moser and George
Fred Vowinckle.
The Senior class is officered by the following: President, John H. Williams;
Vice-President, Robert W. Irving; Recording Secretary, Harvey E. Knupp; Corresponding Secretary, H. W. Savidge;
Treasurer, Willis E. lackey; Historian, I.
I. Wingert; Critic, John E. Small; Sergeant-at-arms, A. 3". Feight; Executive
Committee, J. R. Smith, A. J. Feight,
Geo. T. Brown, Blake Irwin and A. A.
Wingert.

THE SOCIETIES.
A. D. B. Smead, Esq., of the Cumberland county bar, sat as judge in a moot
court case before the Dickinson Society on
February 19th. He handed down alearned
and instructive opinion, much appreciated
by the members.
Chester C. Basehore, Esq., class of '95,
now a member of the Cumberland county
bar, acted as judge at a moot court case of
deceit, in the Allison Society on February
24. He received the hearty thanks of the
society for his services.

The Centre Democrat of Bellefonte, Pa.,
in its issue of March 4th, printed a portrait and sketch of W. H. Walker, '96. It
Simon' P. Northrup has been elected
was a complimentary notice, and predicted much success for Mr. Walker as a president of the Dickinson society, sucmember of the firm of Fortney and Walker. ceeding E. L. Ryan.
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LECTURES BEFORE THE SOCIETIES.
Joseph S. Shapley, Esq., of the class of
'93, and now a member of the Cumberland
county bar, lectured before the Dickinson
Society on Friday evening, February 12th,
on "Orphans' Court Practice."
Mr.
Shapley most clearly and efficiently outlined the practice, dwelling particularly
upon the manner of appointing and the
duties of executors and administrators.
He impressed the student body with the
importance and necessity of a thorough
knowledge of this branch of the law.
Prof. H. Silas Stuart, of the Law School
faculty, lectured before the joint societies
on Friday evening, February 26th. His
subject was "The Rights of Married
Women." He explained how under the
common law, marriage absolved all her
property rights. Then he elucidated in
regular order the statutes of 1848, 1887 and
1893 in Pennsylvania, and told what rights
and what restrictions were now placed
upon woman in handling and disposing of
her property. He contrasted the rights
given by the law to the husband and to
the wife. The lecture was as interesting
as it was instructive, and the Professor
held the very closest attention of his
hearers. He spoke so clearly and concisely
that the students will not soon forget the
valuable instruction he gave on the important subject.

Hon. R. W. Biddle, president judge of
Cumberland county court, delivered an
address before the joint societies on Wednesday evening, March3rd. His subject
was "Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors." The judge modestly termed his
address merely a practical talk, but certain
it is that it was of great benefit to all who
heard him. He explained fully the method
of assignment, and how the assets are converted into cash and distributed for the
benefit of the creditors. He spoke of the
deed of assignment, acceptance by the
assignee and duties resultant therefrom,
the sale of the personalty and realty, and
concluded by an explanation of the statutes
of 1876, 1889 and 1893. He illustrated a
portion of his address by means of actual
legal papers drawn in an assignment in

which he was interested several years ago.
At the conclusion of the lecture, a very
hearty unanimous vote of thanks was
tendered the judge for his very able address. Judge Biddle not only has the
sincere thanks of the student body for the
address given, but also for courtesies extended in the county court-room.

ALMA MATER.
Tune-Annile Lisle.
In that old historic borough,
With its war-scarred walls,
Stands our noble Alma Maier
And her ancient halls.
Cnous:-Lift the chorus, speed it onward,
Loud we praise as one;
Hail to-thee, Oh, Alma Mlfater;
Hail old Dickinson.
Scene of many vital struggles,

In our country's youth;
Ever guardian of the motto
"Liberty and truth."
Tho' we part thon'rt not forgotten,
Guardian of our years,
Where we go thou still art with us,
Hast our love and tears.
How we love thee, Alma Mater
And thy nooks and shades:
In our hearts we hold thee sacred
Till all Nature fades.
-GnoRGn

R. SOMrRVILLE, '97.

COUNTY COURT PRELMVNARY EXAMINATIONS.
A subject of considerable importance to
the legal profession, as well as those preparing to enter it, is the proposed adoption
of a uniform system of preliminary examinations of applicants for registration as
law students in the various counties of
the Commonwealth. That regularity of
the method of examinations, in addition
to a higher standard of qualifications, is
desirable, ig admitted by all who have
given the matter any consideration.
Coming, as we do, in contact with students representing nearly every county in
the State, and through them becoming
acquainted with the courses of study required by examining boards, we are particularly impressed by the great diversity
of the examinations and the variance of
the requirements. Appreciating the im-
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portance of a good preliminary training as
a requisite for the making of a successful
lawyer we cannot but concur most heartily with any movement tending to remedy
these differences.
The Pennsylvania Bar Association's
sub-committee on Curriculum, of the Committee on Legal Education has reported a
scheme of preliminary examination which
will undoubtedly meet with the approval
of a great majority of the lawyers of this
State, and which it is expected, will be
adopted in every county in its proper
time. In the opinion of the members of
the committee, it is deemed advisable to
demand the same thorough preparation,
and on the same subjects, required by the
leading colleges for entrance to the freshman class, the recent adoption of a uniform college admission system by the
conference committee representing Harvard, Yale, Pennsylvania, Princeton,
Columbia and Cornell, being the standard
proposed.
It is expected that every applicant
should have acquainted himself, ere
he thinks of commencing the study of
the law, with English grammar, English
and American literature, and be competent to show his familiarity with the
classics. He should be well-versed in the
outlines of general history; in particular, the careful study of English and
American history should be emphasized.
He should be carefully examined in Latin
grammar. Prose composition should be
insisted on in the Latin course, in which
also he should be thoroughly examined in
four books of.Cmsar and either six books
of the Eneid or the four orations of Cicero
against Cataline. The examination in
mathematics should include a thorough
drill in arithmetic, algebra as far as
quadratics, and one book of Euclid. In
geography the applicant ought to be examined with more than ordinary closeness, particularly on points of national
and international interest.
It is to be regretted that a reform in examibiations was not agitated years ago.
All indications point to higher perfection
in all of the affairs of men, and as the
outcome of the present movement, we
augur a higher type for the legal profession.
-H. F. K.

THE MOOT COURT.
JAMES J. EVANS vs. CONTINENTAL
TRACTION CO.
Street Railways-Act of April 4th, 1868,
construed-Negligence-Damages.
Motion to take off non-suit.
BLAKE IRVIN and JULIAN C. WALKER

for plaintiff.
The act of April 4th, 1868, 2 P. & L.
Dig. 3236, like all other acts creating an exemption from gommon law liabilities,
should be construed strictly. Electric or
traction companies were not in existence
at the time of the passage of the act, and
therefore the exemption does not apply to
them.-Cummings v.
Pittsburg
etc,
Railway Co., 92 Pa. 82; Am. and Eng.
23
Ency. of Law Vol
, p. 399; Gerard v.
P. & R. R. R. bo., 12Phila. 394; Spisak v.
B. & O. R. R. Co., 152 Pa. 281; Noll v. P.
& R. R. R. Co., 163 Pa. 504; Potts v. R.
R. Co., 161 Pa. 396; Christman v. P. & R.
R. R. Co., 141 Pa. 604- Richter v, The
Penna. Co., 104 Pa. 511; U. S. v. Fisher, 2
Cranch 386. The non-suit was therefore
improperly entered and should be taken
off.
GE0. W. BENEDICT, JR. and A. A.
WINGERT for defendant.
The non-suit was properly entered.
-Railroad and railway are synonomous
terms, and therefore street railways are
clearly comprehended in the term "railroadsII as used in the act of April 4th,
1868, 2 P. & L. Dig. 3236.-Phila. Traction Co. v. Oberum, 119 Pa. 37; Lockhart
v. Railway Co., 139 Pa. 419; Hestonville,
etc., R. R. Co. v. Phila., 89 Pa. 210.
Under the act suprathere can be no recovery.-Fleming v. Penna. R. R. Co.,
134 Pa. 477; Muliherrin v. D., L., & W.
R. R. Co., 81 Pa. 366.
OPINION OP COURT.

Defendant, operating a street railway by
cable and intending to convert it into an
electric railway, contracted with Smith to
erect poles. Evans, an employ6 of Smith,
was lifting a pole to place it between the
tracks, when a car of the defendant carelessly handled, was run over his foot, compelling its amputation. The trial court
non-suited the plaintiff solely because of
the act of April 4th, 1868, 2 P. & L. 3236,
and a motion is now made to take off the
non-suit.
Two questions arise. (1.) Did Evans
sustain the injury while lawfully engaged
or employed on or about the road? We
think he did. He was "lawfully engaged"
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in his work. His work was, if not "on,"
"about" the road. The poles were set in
a row between the fwo tracks of the defendant, and at a point so close to them
that the plaintiff's foot was run over by the
car. The plaintiff was "not an employV"
of the defendant,and in this respect answers
to the statutory description. That he was
the employ6 of another person, whose
business required him to work on or about
the road, does not exclude the application
of the statute to him. Mulherrin v. Del.,
L., &W. R. R. Co.,81 Pa. 366. See Spisak
v. Balto. & Ohio R. R. Co., 152 Pa. 281,
for discussion of cases, and compare Noll
v. Phil. & R. R. R., 103 Pa. 501.
(2.) The next question is, was the
"road" the road of a "railroad company."
The road on which the injury happened
is generally called a railway. A way is a
road and a railway is a railroad. The
synonymousness of these words has been
sometimes declared.
Hestonville, etc.,
Passenger Railroad Co. v. Phila., 89 Pa.
210; Gyger v. Railway Co., 136 Pa. 96.
But, while often identified, they are
sometimes distinguished. Gyger v. Railway Co., supra. It is matter of common
knowledge, that the steam roads procured
the passage of the act of 1868. At that
time there were no electric or traction railways, and horse railways had been developed only to a limited extent. The
business of steam railroads brings many
persons, not their own employ6s into relation with them in many sorts of work;
e. g., unloading cars, Ricard v. North, Pa.
R. R. Co., 89 Pa. 193; Cummings v. Pittsburg, etc., Railway Co., 92 Pa. 82; Gerand
v. Pa. R. R. Co., 5 W. N. C. 25.51: loading
cars, Kirby v. Pa. R. R. Co., 76 Pa. 506:
hauling freight to car, Balt. & Ohio R.
R. Co., v. Colvin, 118 Pa. 230: uncoupling
cars pushed into adjacent premises on
switches, Stone v. Pa. R. R. Co., 132 Pa.
206. Out of these relations numerous accidents arise, avoidance of liability for which,
on the part of the railroads, was the manifest object of the act of 1868. Similar
reasons do not extend to passenger railways. They carry no freight. As to passengers, the act of 1868 expressly excepts
them from its operation. There is no more
reason for the exemption of these railway
companies from liability for damages occasioned by their servants, than for the ex-

emption of any corporations, partnerships,
or individuals engaged in other business.
While the constitutionality of the act of
1868 has been sustained in Kirby v. Pa. R.
R. Co., 76 Pa. 506, the decision in which
is probably more acceptable than the
reasons alleged for it, we are aware of no
case.in which the soundness of its policy
has been so heartily approved as to justify
the extension of it to cases not clearly
within its scope. It exempts one sort of
corporation from a liability imposed by
the common law upon all other corporations, and upon all natural persons. Such
a statute, like criminal statutes, like
statutes conferring corporate or other
privileges, should not receive a liberal
construction. We are not aware that in
any free country there is a disposition to
exempt employers from liability for wrongs
to strangers inflicted b their servants and
agents. One unmistakable exception has
been made by statute, in fa-vor of a business which happens to have enormous
power in the state, and whose agency in
the procurement of the exception is more
than a matter of suspicion. We are unable to consent to gratuitously widen the
exemption so as to make another privileged, powerful class of interests.
We shall therefore take off the judgment
of non-suit.
HENRY KIRWAN vs. EDWARD
CRAWFORD.
Contract for insurance- Negligencear'ehousernen'sliability.
Action in assumpsit.
P. E. RADLE and ALBERT T. ]MORGAN
for the plaintiff.
There was a specific contract between
bailor and bailee.-Siter v. Morris, 13 Pa.
218; Hoy v. Hart, 91 Pa. 91; Home Ins.
Co. v. Balto. Warehouse Co., 93 U. S. 527.
The defendant did not use the usual
amount of diligence required of bailees.2 Am. & Eng. Buoy. of Law, 51; Scott v.
Bank, 72 Pa. 471; Camp v. Bank, 94 Pa.
409.
The defendant's negligence in not effecting insurance within six days after being
requested to do so, was gross negligence.Reniington v. Irwin, 14 Pa. 143; Shepler
v. Scott, 85 Pa. 329; Railroad Co. v. McElree, 67 Pa. 311; Cleveland Rolling Mlill
Co. v. Rhodes, 121 U. S. 255- Waterman
v. Banks, 144 U. S. 394; Sun Pire Ins. Of-
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flee v. Ermentrout, 11 Pa. C. C. 21; Learning v. Wise, 73 Pa. 173; Morgan v. McRee,
77 Pa. 228; Davis v. Stuart, 99 Pa. 295;
Knaber v. Ins. Co., 129 Pa. 8.
The plaintiff is entitled to damages to
the amount of his loss.-Fiegal v. Latour,
81 Pa. 448; MLorris v. Parkham, 4 Phila. 62.
SYLVESTER B. SADLER and CLAUDE L.
ROTH for defendant.
The defendant is liable only for negligence which the plaintiff must prove.Tower v. Grocer's Supply & Storage Co.,
159 Pa. 106; Furnham v. R. R. Co., 55 Pa.
53; Steamship Co. v. Smart, 107 Pa. 492.
The agreement is nudum pactum, there
being no offer and acceptance, and.no consideration. Defendant is liable only for
misfeasance.-JThorne v. fleas, 4 Johns.
84; Frauenthall v. IDerr, 13 W. N. C. 485;
N. Y. Tartar Co. v. French, 154 Pa. 274.
The defendant's delay was not negligence.-Insurance Co. v. Spencer & RcKay, 53 Pa. 353; Patterson v. Ins. Co., 81*
Pa. 458. If negligence, causa proxima,
non remota, speclatur.-MNorrison v. Davis
& Co., 20 Pa. 175; R. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94
U. S. 469; Behling v. Pipe Line Co., 160
Pa. 359.
A valuable consideration would have
made the contract one of insurance and
void under act of 4th February, 1870.-1 P.
& L. Dig. 2385, P. L. 14. 1; Abbott v.
Walker, 118 Pa. 249; Com. v. Vrooman,
164 Pa. 306.
Defendant acted as broker. on contract
for insurance and is not liable for failure
to procure.-1 P. & L. Dig. 2398, P. L. 53,
43; Abbott v. Walker, sulpra. Under act
1 May, 1876, such a contract is void.-1 P.
& L. Dig. 2398, P. L. 53, ?46; Thorne v.
Ins. Co., 80 Pa. 15; Holt v. Green, 73 Pa.
198.
CIARGE OF THE COURT.
Gentlemen of the Jury :
Crawford, a warehouseman, received
articles on store, charging for them according to their bulk and value. He was in
the habit of taking insurance on such articles when requested, and when he did so,
his rates were higher than when no such
demand was made.
Kirwan left with
Crawford paintings worth $10,000, that
value, being assigned to them in the
certificate of storage. At the same time
he requested Crawford to take out the insurance, omitting however to specify the
amohnt of the policy, the time during
which it was to run, the insurer, or the
premium. On the eighth day afterwards the
warehouse and paintings were totally destroyed by fire. Crawford made.no effort
to procure insurance until the sixth day,
when he saw an agent, who promised to
examine the paintings and agree as to the
terms of a policy, but falling sick of pneu-

monia on the same day, he failed to keep
his engagement. On the morning of the
day of the fire, Crawford telephoned to the
agent of another company to call on him.
The fire occurred before this agent saw
Crawford. Kirwan demands $10,000 in
this action.
The defendant resists a recovery for
various reasons, which we will consider
seriathim.
1. The promise to procure insurance was
gratuitous and not enforceable.
It is needless to cite more than Frauenthall v. Derr, 13 W. N. C. 485; Thorne v.
fleas, 4 Johns, 84; New York Tartar Co. v.
French, 154 Pa. 273, in support of the principle that a gratuitous promise to procure
insurance, unless followed by misfeasance,
as distinguished from non-feasance, imposes no liability upon the promissor.
But, is the promise of Crawford gratuitous? That promise was made at the
monment of the deposit of the goods. It
was one of the inducements to the making
of the deposit. That Kirwan left his
paintings with Crawford on account of this
promise was consideration enough to make
it obligatory. A warehouseman's promise
to insure goods is not a " voluntary and
gratuitous act," but "an undertaking in
connection with the bailment." Tower v.
Supply and Storage Co., 159 Pa. 106. The
letting of a house, is a consideration for
the lessee's promise to have it insured for
$6,000. Jacksonville Railway Co. v.
Hooperi 160 U. S. 514. If at a purchase
ofgoodstlhe buyer orders the goods, which
are to be shipped by water, to be insured
by the seller, the act of purchase furnishes
the consideration for his undertaking to
insure. N. Y. Tartar Co. v. French, 154
Pa. 273.
2. Defendant alleges that the contract
was prohibited by statute. The 43d section
of the act of May 1st, 1876, 1 P. & L. Dig.
2397, declares that "whoever acts or aids
in any manner in negotiating contracts of
insurance * * for any person other than

himself, receiving compensation therefor"
and not being an agent of the company,
"shall be deemed to be an insurance
broker," and section 44 forbids any person to be an insurance broker "until
he has procured a certificate of authority
so to act from the insurance commissioner." The 46th section declares that
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"one acting as broker without the certificate
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Defendant infers from these acts that his
contracting to procure an insurance was
illegal, and that no action can be sustained upon the contract.
But, (a) there is no evidence that Crawford did not have the certificate. As in
Arrott v. Walker, 118 Pa. 249, "it is to be
,assumed "1that he had the certificate "because there is no evidence to the contrary;
it is to be assumed, of course, that he complied with the law," 118 Pa. 2.50. [The
S. C. do not dissent from this position.]
(b) There is no evidence that Kirwan
knew that Crawford had no certificate,
even if the latter in fact had none. It
would be a singular law that would permit Crawford acting without lawful
authority, to set up the illegality of his
conduct against one dealing with him in
ignorance of the fact which made it illegal. Clark, Contracts 477.
(c) Crawford was not within the scope
of the legislation above cited. It has
long been usual for wharfingers, warehousemen, factors and commission mer-,
chants to cause the goods deposited with
them, or in their possession, to be insured.
Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore Warehouse
Co., 93 U. S. 527; Siter v. Morrs, 13 Pa.
218. We do not think that the legislation
of 1876 was intended to extirpate this
practice. It was not designed to require
those who caused insurance upon goods
with which they dealt, to be certificated.
(d) Crawford could have insured the
paintings for their full value, in his own
name, and not as agent, and Kirwan
could have availed himself of the insurance thus procured. 93 U. S. 527 ; 13 Pa.
218, supra. Surely the statute would not
have prevented such an insurance. There
is nothing in the case that shows that any
other form of insurance was intended.
That Crawford promised to do what he
might have done without the promise will
hardly make the thing done illegal.
3. Defendant alleges that Crawford
was in no default when the fire occurred.
It must be conceded that Crawford's undertaking was not absolutely to procure
an insurance. What was intended by the
parties was that he should "exercise diligence and good faith in his effort to procure insurance." Arrott v. Walker, 118

Pa. 249. He could not compel insurers to
accept the risk, nor did he undertake that
they should. Did he then exercise the
diligence that he contracted to exercise?
" He made no effort to procure insurance
on the paintings until the sixth day after
the deposit."
The effort made on that
day was abortive. Re then waited until
the eighth day, on which, before arranging
for an insurance, the fire happened.
When the facts are ascertained, what is
a reasonable time is a question of law for
the court. Learning v. Wise, 73 Pa. 173 ;
Morgan v. McKee, 77 Pa. 228 ; Davis v.
Stuard, 99 Pa. 295. We think we must determine that the omission for six days to
attempt to obtain an insurance on $10,000
worth of goods was a non-compliance with
the contract. The delay was unreasonably
long. In Knaber v. Union Ins. Co., 129
Pa. 8, and Sun Fire Office v. Ermentrout,
11 Pa. C. C. 21, [see the very learned
opinion of Judge Endlich] insurance companies instructed their agents to cancel
certain policies. In the former the order
to cancel, sent from Philadelphia, June
30th, was received in York by the agent
on July 1st. He did not cancel, and the
saw mill burned down on July 7th.
In
the latter the order to cancel was sent on
January 16th or 17th, and the fire occurred
on January 23d, the agent not cancelling.
The companies being compelled to pay the
losses, in an action by them against the
agents the court held, as matter of law,
that the delay was unreasonable. In the
former case only $500 and in the latter
only $1,500 was at stake. In the case before us the very considerable sum of
$10,000 was at hazard. No explanation of
the tardiness of Crawford is offered.
It is our duty, therefore, gentlemen of
the jury, to instruct you, there being no
facts in dispute, that your verdict must
be for the plaintiff for the sum of $10,000
with interest from the time when the bailment was to terminate, less the fees payable by the plaintiff to Crawford for his
services as warehouseman.
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EDWARD COOPER vs. FRANCIS K.
BOWER.
Devise- Words of Limitation---ustsGift of income-Restricting a fee.
Case stated.
R. W. IRVING and J.P. COSTELLO for
plaintiff.
A devise of the rents, issues, and profits
of land, is a devise of the land itself.-Van
Rensaeler v. Durkin's Executors, 24 Pa.
252; Williams v. Leech, 28 Pa. 89; Francis'
Estate, 75 Pa. 220.
When in a devise of a remainder to the
"children" of the first taker, it appears
that "children" is used in the sense of
"issue," it is to be treated as a word of
limitation.-Haldeman v. Haldeman, 40
Pa. 29.
By virtue of the act of April 8th, 1833,
Purd. Dig. 2103, coupled with the presumption against intestacy as to the remainder, Little's Appeal, 81 Pa. 190, Edward takes a fee.-Dilworth v. Gusky, 131
Pa. 343.
That a fee passes to Edward, may be inferred from the fact that such an estate
was given to the other children, and no
reason can be assigned for giving Edward
a less estate.-Postlethwaite's Appeal, 68
Pa. 478; McIntire v. McIntire, 123 Pa. 329.
GEo. B. SOmERVILLE and HUGH R.
MILLER for defendant.

In the construction of wills, the intention of the testator must govern, where
that intention is not in opposition to rules
oflaw.-Ruston v. Ruston, 2 Dallas 244.
It clearly appears that the testator intended that Edward should not take a fee.
An active trust is created.-McClellan's
Appen , 130 Pa. 451; Watson's Appeal, 125
Pa. 340; Culbertson's Appeal, 76 Pa. 145.
Cooper has not such an interest as
would enable him to convey a fee.-Lancaster v. Dolan, 1 Rawle 246; Barnett's
Appeal, 46 Pa. 392; Douglas v. Cruger, 80
N.Y. 15; Lewin on Trusts, 470; Williams'
Appeal, 83 Pa. 377; Ruby's Appeal, 11
Atlan. Rep. 398.
OPINION OF COURT.

When Morris Cooper died, there survived him a widow, a son, a daughter,
and a grand-daughter, daughter of a deceased son. The second clause of his will
is : "ISecond, I give and bequeath to my
son Edward Cooper the income of the following properties, viz: 234 State street,
641, 643, 64-5 M\ain street, and 347 Clinton
street, Doylestown, Pa., and I hereby
direct the Bucks County Trust Company
to take charge of these houses, collect the
rents, keep them in repair, pay the taxes,

and pay the balance of income therefrom,
in monthly payments, to my son Edward
for the support of himself, wife, and children."
Edward Cooper on Sune 1, 1896, contracted to convey 347 Clinton street,
Doylestown, to Francis H. Bower and his
heirs for $1,000, payable on the delivery of
the deed. The deed being tendered, Bower
declined to accept it, because, as he alleged,
Cooper had only a life-estate. In this
action, Cooper seeks to recover the $1,000.
His right to recover rests on his ability to
pass to Bower a fee simple. Has he this
ability?
That some interest is devised to Edward
Cooper is clear. The presumption against
intestacy, as to any part of the testator's
interest, Little's Appeal, 81 Pa. 190;
Widener v. Beggs, 118 Pa. 374, fortified by
the fact that his entire estate in the lots
devised to his daughter and grand-daughter, is given to them and there is no discoverable reason for giving to Edward a
less estate, and by the act of April 8, 1833,
Williams v. Leech, 28 Pa. 89; Shirly v.
Postlethwaite, 72 Pa. 39; Dilworth v.
Gusky, 131 Pa. 343; McIntire v. McIntire,
123 Pa. 329; Crosky v. Dodds, 87 Pa. 359,
points to the inference that a fee passes to
Edward. Are there any infirmative or
corroborative features of the will? The
testator directs the Trust company to pay
over the income "to my son Edward for
the support of himself, wife, and children," and it has been suggested that
"children," here to be interpreted as equivalent to issue, shows an intent that a fee
should vest In Edward. But, children is
normally not a word of limitation, Oyster
v. Knull, 137 Pa. 448, and that it is here
employed as such, neither the will nor any
ascertained circumstances furnish an indicium. Besides, the direction is not to
pay the income over to Edward and to his
children, but to pay it over to Edward.
The naming of the children in the phrase
which states the object of the payment
does not give them an interest in the income. Cressler's Appeal, 161 Pa. 427;
Dale v. Dale, 13 Pa. 446; Paisley's Appeal,
70 Pa. 249; 'Mazurie's Estate, 132 Pa. 157;
Haskins v. Tate, 25 Pa. 249.
What are the features of the -willinfirmative of the hypothesis that the gift of
an unqualified fee to Edward was intend-
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ed? The gift to Edward is of"the income
of the following properties."
But, unless
qualified, the gift of the income, rents and
profits of land, is a gift of the land.
Crosky v. Dodds, 87 Pa. 359; Drusadow v.
Wilde, 63 Pa. 170; Kline's Appeal, 117 Pa.
139. Primafacie,the devise of the income
to Edward, followed by no devise to others,
vests in him the land itself in fee.
Is there any effectual qualification of the
gift of the income, such that it will not be
equivalent to the gift of the land? There
is hardly room to doubt that the testator
intended to interpose between Edward and
the lots, the income of which was devised
to him, the controlling agency of another.
The devises to the daughter and granddaughter are of "the following described
properties," while that to Edward is of "the
income of the following described properties." The testator likewise directs the
Bucks County Trust Company to take
charge of these houses, collect the rents,
keep them in repair, pay the taxes, and
pay the balance of the income therefrom
monthly to Edward. Though the lots are
not given to the Trust Company, these
words would be sufficient to create a trust,
were the trust legitimate, on account of
its purpose and duration. Such functions
bestowed on one, made him a trustee, in
Sheets' Estate, 52 Pa. 257. The words
"My son Levi is to have $2000 out of my
estate * * and I do appoint my son
George as a committee for my son Levi to
take charge of all his money and pay him
the interest and so much of the principal
that will give him a comfortable support,"
made a spendthrift trust. Smith v. Savidge, 4 Penny. 320; Cf. Beilstein's Estate,
147 Pa. 85; Cooper's Estate, 150 Pa. 576.
[See Widener v. Beggs, 118 Pa. 374;
Hoeveler v. Hune, 138 Pa. 442.]
But is this trust, if trust it be, effectual?
How long is it to last? The will does not
expressly say. Is it at least for Edward's
life? Is it intended to outlast his life?
What is the purpose of this trust? Is it
to withdraw from Edward, at the instant
of constituting him the owner in fee of
the lots, the power of managing them and
of alienating them? We may doubtless
infer such purpose. Will effect be given
to it? We know no case in which a trust
of this class has been held valid for the

life of the devisee in fee. If the trust is
valid, it is conclusive against the existence
of more than a life estate in the cestui que
trust. If the estate in him is a fee, that
circumstance is conclusive against the validity of the trust. Willard v. Davis, 3
Penny. 87. Two intents, inconsistent in
law, have presided apparently over the
making of this devise. The first is to bestow the entire estate in the lots, and,
since no devisee other than Edward is
named, to bestow this estate upon him,
The second is, to restrict his proprietary
control over the land during, we may presume, his natural life. The will of the law
to protect a fee from restrictions deemed
incompatible with its nature; e. g., from
a restriction on alienability, or other powers of ownership, is stronger than its will
to effectuate trusts or other devices by
which such restrictions are imposed. The
reluctance to strike down a trust, of the
class found here, is, we think, less than to
hold what would be the inevitable consequence of maintaining it, that the testator
died intestate as to the reversion after a
life estate in Edward, with respect to the
five lots.
It is true that certain cases recognize the
possibility of clogging a fee in a married
woman by a sole and separate use, H:rays
v. Leonard, 155 Pi. 574; Wilbert's Estate,
166 Pa. 113; Cobb's Appeal, 168 Pa. 175;
Dodson v. Ball, 60 Pa. 492; Megargee v.
Naglee, 64 Pa. 216; Wright v. Brown, 44
Pa. 224, and upon the cessation of the
coverture determine the fee in her to be divested of all trust, Dodson v. Ball, sapra,
but we are aware of no other species of
trust for life that has been deemed compatible with'a fee in the cestui que trust.
We do not infer the ineffectualness of
the trust from its passivity. If it is a trust
at all, it is active. Cooper's Estate, 150
Pa. 576; Little v. Wilcox, 119 Pa. 439;
Lightner's Appeal, 11 W. N." C. 181; Girard, etc., Trust Co. v. Chambers, 46 Pa.
48.5; Ashhurst's Appeal, 77 Pa. 464. We
think it void because incompatible with
the fee which is in the cestui que trust.
As a fee passed to Edward Cooper by
the devise, untrameled by any trust, judgment will be entered on the case stated
for him and against the defendant, for the
sum of $1,000.
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JOHN RUTT vs. JEREMIAH BONHAM;
SAMUEL MANSFIELD, GARNISHEE.
Attachment-executions-Rights of attaching creditor-fechanics' liens-Contract-eleases.
Rule for judgment on answers of garnishee.
JOSEPHr F. BIDDLE and PAUL H. PRICE
for plaintiff.
A stipulation in the building contract
that the building shall be delivered free
from all mechanics' liens, precludes the
filing of such.-Shroeder v. Galland, 134
Pa. 277; Benedict v. Hood, 134 Pa. 289;
Brown v. Cowen, 110 Pa. 588; Dershermen
v. Maloney, 143 Pa. 532; Nice v. Walker,
153 Pa. 123; Given v. Bethlehem .Church,
11 W. N. C. 371; Cote v. Schoen, 1 Super.
Ct. 583.
Mansfield not having requested releases,
Bonham was iot required to furnish them.
Bonham having performed his part of
the contract, the last installment of $1,000
is due and may be attached.
HARVEY S. 1ZrsER for garnishee.
There is no stipulation in the contract
that is sufficient to preclude the filing of
mechanics' liens.-Moore v. Carter, 146
Pa. 492; Taylor v. Murphy, 148 Pa. 337;
Evans v. Grogan, 153 Pa. 121; Rynd v.
Pittsburg Natatorium, 173 Pa.2.7; Schmid
v. Palm Garden Improvement Co., 162
Pa. 211; Smith v. Leirck, 153 Pa. 522.
The attaching creditor stands in the
same relation to the garnishee as was occupied by the defendant before the attachment was laid.-T. &. H. Pr., 1188;
Myers v. Baltzell, 37 Pa. 491; Roig v. Tim,
103 Pa. 115.
The furnishing of releases is a condition
prec-edent to the payment of the last installment.-Kinsloe v. Davis, 167 Pa. 519;
Moore v-.Carter,
supra; Schotts v. Bell,
18 Pa. C. C. 427.
OPINION OF COURT.

Samuel Mansfield, owner of a lot in
Shippensburg, contracted with Bonham
to build a house on it. The contract stipulated that the money should be paid by
Mansfield to Bonham in instalments, and,
as respects the last instalment of $1,000,
that it should "be paid when the building
is finished, the said buildingto be delivered
to Mansfield free from all mechanics' liens,
and the said Bonham shall, if requested
by Mansfield. furnish releases of all persons
who could file mechanics' liens before the
said $1,000 shall be paid." Before the payment of the $1,000 John Rutt, having obtained a judgment for $1,733 against Bonham, sued out the present attachment ex-

ecution, attaching the $1,000 in Mansfield's
hands. When the writ was issued, there
were claims of materialmen to the extqnt
of $1,497, for some of which, to the amount
of $734.29 liens had been already filed. For
the remainder there is still time to file.
Upon these facts we are asked by John
Rutt to enter a judgment against the garnishee.
The duty on Mansfield to pay the $1,000
is by the contract conditioned on the furnishing of releases to him by Bonham if
requested. Although he has not already
requested, he has not forfeited the right to
request now, and in this proceeding he
insists on his right to request and obtain
the releases.
Itis said, in answer to this claim, that no
valid mechanics' liens could arise under
the contract between Mansfield and Bonham and that the condition of the payment of the $1,000 is illusory and nugatory.
An express stipulation that no liens should
be filed, would have made the effectual
filing of liens impossible. Shroeder v.
Galland, 134 Pa. 277; Benedict v. Hood, 134
Pa. 289. Here there is no such stipulation.
The agreement is that the building shall
be delivered free from all mechanics' liens,
and that Bonham shall, if requested, furnish releases of liens. As has been said in
cases construing similar stipulations, this
language recognizes the possibility of filing
liens, and provides for their extinction
before the final payment. Rynd v. Pittsburg Natatorium, 173 Pa. 237; Evans v.
Grogan, 153 Pa. 121; Taylor v. Murphy, 148
Pa. 337; Murphy v. Morton, 139 Pa. 314;
Nice v. Walker, 153 Pa. 123; Murphy v.
fDiebold, 139 Pa. 345; Smith v. Levick, 153
Pa. 522; Schmid v. Palm Garden Improvement Co. 162 Pa. 211.
An agreement by
the contractor to obtain a release of liens
will not preclude even his filing a lien for
himself, nor his obtaining a judgment
upon the scire facias. Moore v. Carter
146 Pa. 492. Execution, however, would
be stayed, until the other liens were released.
Mansfield's house is therefore lienable,
to the extent of $1,497. He could not be
compelled to pay Bonham the $1,000 still
due on the contract, until the liens were
extinguished, and the rights of Rutt, the
attaching creditor, are not superior to
Bonham's. Releases have not been pro-
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cured. Schotts v. Bell, 18 Pa. C. C. 427.
It is ordered that judgment for the garnishee be entered, and that the attachment be dissolved.

ESTATE OF JAN1ES LETT, DECEASED.
Devise-Trust-Rule in Shelly's Case.
Petition for the appointment of a trustee.
E. H. HOFFM[AN and MILES H. MURR
for the guardian.
The decedent's will gives his widow a
life estate. Fox's Appeal, 99 Pa. 382;
Homet v. Bacon, 126 Pa. 176; Oyster v.
KnulI, 137 Pa. 448.
Having been discharged of the trust on
petition, the sons of the deceased take only
the equitable interest for their respective
lives. Bacon's Appeal, 57 Pa. 504; Rife
v. Geyer, 59 Pa. 393; Oyster v. Oyster, 100
Pa. 538; Taylor v. Taylor, 63 Pa. 48]
Mannerback's Estate, 133 Pa. 342; Harbster's Estate, 133 Pa. 351. The Rule in
Shelly's Case will not apply to the widow's
estate nor to that of decedent's sons. 2
Washburn Real Prop. 495; Jones v.
Laughton, I Eq. Cas. Abr. 392; Adamsv.
Adams, 6 Q. B. 860; Curtis v. Rice, 12
Ves. 89 ; Talhlman v. Wood, 26 Wend. 9;
Bacon's Appeal, 57 Pa. 504.
A trusteeship created by willhwhich becomes vacant can be filled by the Orphans'
Court. Act 22d Apr. 1846, 2 Pur. Dig.
2034, 53.
FRANK H. STROUSS and FREDERICK B.

MOSER contra.
The wife took a life estate. Dunwoodie
v. Reed, 3 S. & R. 435; Maurer v. Marshall, 16 Pa. 377; 'Hahn v. Hutchinson,
159 Pa. 133.
The sons acquired a vested remainder
in fee simple. Steacy v. Rice, 27 Pa. 75 ;
Seeley v. Seele.y, 44 Pa. 434; Physick's
Appeal, 50 Pa. 128; Kepple's Appeal, 53
Pa. 211; Potts v. Kline, 174 Pa. 513; Pennock v. Eagles, 102 Pa. 290.
The Rule in Shelly's Case applying,
there is no trust existing for the children
of the sons.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The will of James Lett contains the
following: " I give my farm and houses
in the town of Carlisle to my widow in
trust, she to receive for her own use the
rents and income thereof as long as she
shall live. After her death, my will is
that my sons, John, Uriah and Samuel
shall receive the said farm and houses in
trust, to take to themselves in equal shares
the net income thereof so long as they
shall live, and at the death of each, I

devise his share to his heirs." During the
widow's life, John, Uriah and Samuel
were discharged from the trust assumed
to be in them. After the widow's death,
Amos Randall, being appointed guardian
of the children of John, Uriah and Samuel, (all of whom are living,) petitions the
Orphans' Court for the appointment of a
trustee. Samuel and Uriah resist the
petition, but John assents to it.
The Orphans' Court cannot create atrust,
and if there is no trust, it cannot appoint
a trustee. The fact that it has, on an
earlier occasion, assumed that there was
a trust, by discharging the supposed trustees, John, Uriah and Samuel, neither
created a trust, nor estops anybody from
now denying the previous existence of a
trust. Is there then a trust? We fail to
find any. In the first place, James Lett
gives the farm and houses to his widow,
and "in trust." But the only duty prescribed is " to receive for her own use the
rents and income thereof so long as she
shall liye." It hardly needs authority to
establish the non-existence of a trust
when the legal title is conveyed to one,
for the sole benefit of himself. The interests of the widow, legal as well as
equitable, is merely a life estate, for the
testator declares that after her death "my
(his) will is my (his) sons * * *shall receive
the said farm and houses in trust." If
there are trusts at all, there is a succession
of them, the widow having the legal estate clothed with a trust, during her life,
and the sons the legal estate clothed with a
trust, after her death. Plainly the word
"in trust," used to characterize the devise
of the wife was inept and insignificant.Do the sons acquire the land subject to
a trust? They are, after the widow's
death, to receive it, says the testator, "in
trust." But in trustto do what? In trust
"to take to themselves in equal shares the
net income thereof so long as they shall
live." They are to hold the land, they are
to take to themselves the net income.
They are also to determine to what extent
the gross income shall be expended, and
therefore what shall be the net income
which they are to take. Here then, is a
complete fusion of the legal and the equitable interest during their life.
Is the trust protracted beyond their
lives for the benefit of their children? No

THE FORUM.
such trust is declared. On the contrary,
the testator distinctly states that "at the
death of each (son) I devise his share to
his heirs." A trust for "heirs," stating
no object, specifying no duration, would be
void. But the creation of no such trust is
attempted.
The trust during the lives of the sons
being a "dry" trust., it does not prevent
the operation of the rule in Shelly's case.
The land is given to them for life, and
at the death of each "to his heirs." The
sons take a fee-simple; the heirs take
nothing. Inasmuch as nemo haeres viventis est, their children are not heirs.
There is no trust; there can be appointed
np trustee. The petition therefore of the
guardian of the grandchildren of the testator is dismissed.

ESTATE OF EDWARD PRITCHARD,
DECEASED.
Devise-Effect of date of will-Advancement-Interest-Debt-Declaration
of Testator.
Exceptions to the auditor's report.
J. EVERETT SMALtL and GEo. T. BROWN
for exceptaut.
1. It is clear that the testator intended
to give Simon an absolute gift or a release
of the principal debt. Such intention
will control where there is an irreconcilable contradiction.-Newbold v. Boone,
52 Pa. 167; Steckle's Appeal, 29 Pa. 235;
Jarmon on Wills, Vol. 2,.p. 44; Shreiner's
Appeal, 53 Pa. 106; Sniveley v. Stover, 78
Pa. 484; Wentz v. DeHaven, 1 S. &R. 312;
Story's Appeal, 83 Pa. 89; Kreider v.
Boyer, 10 Watts 54; Kirby's Appeal, 109
Pa. 41.
2. Interest should be charged on advancements from the time of the filing of
the executor's account to the time of distribution.-Force's Estate, 11 Phila. 97;
Thompson's Estate, 8 W. N. C. 16; Wagner's Estate, 38 Pa. 125; Yundt's Appeal,
13 Pa. 575; Patterson's Appeal, 128 Pa.
269.
EDMUND LOCKE RYAN and R. W.
IRVING for Auditor's report.

In cases of doubt, that construction is
to be placed upon a will which tends most
to preserve consistency.-Redfield on
Wills, p. 432; Mutter's Estate, 38 Pa. 314;
Howitz v. Norris, 00 Pa. 261; Howe v.
Van Schaick, 3 N. Y. 538; Chrystie v.
Phyfe, 19 N. Y. 344.
The only consistent conclusion that can
be drawn, is that the conveyance was

made subsequent to the making of the
will. The auditor was therefore correct
in deducting the amount of the debt from
Simon's share.-Miller's Appeal, 113 Pa.
459; Patterson's Appeal, 128 Pa. 269;
Firman's Estate, 2 Dist. Rep. 261; Bailey's
Estate, 153 Pa. 402; Pepper's Estate, 154
Pa. 340; Suplee's Appeal, 16 W. N. C. 378;
Smith's Appeal, 33 Pa. 9; Etter's Estate,
23 Pa. 381.
The idea that a gift was meant is repelled by the fact that an obligation for
the payment of the amount was taken.Roland v. Schrack, 29 Pa., 125; Haverstick
v. Sarbach, 1 W. &. S. 390; Patterson's
Appeal, supra.
OP NION OF COURT.

Pritchard died March, 1890. His will
directed that after the payment of debts
and legacies, "the remainder of my (his)
personal estate shall be divided equally
among my children, Amos, Thomas and
Simon, and all debts owing to me by any
of my sons, and all advances made to them.
shall be deemed portions of the remainder
of my personal estate, and those of them
owing these debts or having received these
advancements, shall receive correspondingly less in the distribution; but I have
made no advancements to Simon, nor has
he ever been indebted to me." Twentynine years before the decedent's death, he
had sold a farm to Simon for $2,755, taking
from him a bond and mortgage for $2,255,
and a promissory note for $500, payable
Aug. 7th, 1863. The interest on both bond
and note was regularly paid by Simon,
until his father's death. In abook left by
decedent was a memorandum importing
that he had advanced $1,700 to Amos and
$1,349 to Thomas. The residue of the estate, not including the bond and note of
Simon, or the advancements to Amos and
Thomas, was $17,492. The auditor has
charged Amos and Thomas with their respective advancements, but without any
interest. He has charged Simon with a
debt of $2,755, with interest thereon,
$661.20. He has thus found the estate to
amount to $23,957.20, of which the share
of each son is $7,985.731. The latter sum,
less $3,416.20 ($2,75-5 plus $661.20) leaves
for Simon's present dividend, $4,569.53J.
Simon excepts because (1) no interest was
charged on the advancements to Amos
and Thomas. (2.) Because the alleged
debt of his was deducted from his share.
The first of these exceptions must be
sustained. Advancements do not bear in-
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terest unless the person making them
expressly declares that they are to bear interest, until one year after the decedent's
death. But they then begin to bear interest.
Patterson's Appeal, 128 Pa. 269.
The exceptant insists that interest for four
years should be added to the advancements. As the testator died in March, 1890,
and the estate is now undergoing distribution, interest for nearly six years is properly chargeable.
It is an undisputed fact that Simon was
indebted to his father since 1861, for the
purchase money of a farm, and that interest on the debt has been uninterruptedly
paid thereon down to 1890. In the will,
however, the testator states that Simon
has never been indebted to him. The
truth of the statement depends on the
time of the making of the will. If the
will was made before 1861 the averment is
correct, if made after 1861, incorrect.
If the will were shown to have been
made before 1861 we should be compelled
to say that as the declaration of the testator accorded with the existing facts, it
could not be understood either to deny
the future existence of debts of Simon or
to express the purpose of the testator that
in making distribution, such debts, if any,
should be ignored.
On the hypothesis that Simon's debts
were contracted in 1861, and that the will
was made at some later period, nearer to
his death, what consequences will flow
from the testamentary denial of Simon's
indebtedness?
A mere declaration about a fact can
neither make nor abolish that fact. An
averment by a testator that a son is indebted, would neither make norprove him
to be indebted. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 47 Pa. 378. Nor could an averment
that he is not indebted unmake or conclusively disprove the indebtedness. As an
admission against interest by the testator
it would be strong evidence; but it could
not estop; it would not be insurmountable.
In the case before us, the fact that Simon
was indebted despite the testamentary
declaration is admitted.
But, although the testator's statement
that a son is indebted or that he is not indebted will not prove thefact of indebtedness or non-indebtedness, it may disclose
a purpose on his part, that his estate shall

be distributed as if the indebtedness existed, or as if it did not exist. As he
could refuse any share in his estate to the
legatee, he can give to the latter as much
or as little as he wishes. He may if he
choosesfeign a debt, and direct its deduction from the share of the beneficiary, or
feign the non-existence of a debt, with the
intention to avoid a deduction of it. The
important question then is, on the supposition that the will was written after the
rise of the Simon debt, does it indicate
the intention that the debt should be disregarded in ascertaining Simon's share
of the estate? Only two hypotheses in regard to the denial of the debt, are possible.
Either the testator intended merely to
state a fact, but not to effectuate a definite
result by means of the assumption of this
fact., if such assumption should be untrue,
or, conscious ofthe fact, he denied itin order
to manifest the purpose that it should not
be considered, in partitioning the estate.
In viewof the case of Eichelberger's Estate.
135 Pa. 160, we feel constrained to adopt
the latter interpretation. It was there
held that a testator having declared that
his children should share alike, and having immediately appended a list of debts
owed to him by children, it could not be
shown that one of the children mentioned
as debtor had in fact never been indebted. It was said that the testator
evidently intended .$3,600 (the debt mentioned), to be deducted from the share of
his daughter Jane, and that error in the
assumption of the existence of the debt
could have no legal consequences.
If the purpose that a sum shall be assumed to be a debt, in determining the
shares of children, is controlling, without
regard to the trutli or falseness of the assumption, a fortiori, would the purpose
that an actual debt be assumed never to
have existed, be controlling, whether such
debt existed or not. Pritchard directs an
equal division of his estate among his
three sons. In making this he orders all
advancements to, and debts of the sons
t9 be considered portions of the estate; he
then adds "but I have made no advancements to Simon, nor has he ever been indebted to me." If he was conscious, at the
moment, of Simon's debt, he could have
had no other purpose than that Simon's
debt should not be deducted from his
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share. Eichelberger's Estate, supra, forbids our speculating whether, if he was at
the moment not conscious of the debt, he
would if consciousi have intended the debt
to be ignored. How, (1) can we know that
he was not conscious of the debt? It is almost impossible to think, if he had testamentary capacity at all, that he was ignorantly denying such a fact as this. Though
the debt was old, there had been an annual
revival of the recollection of it; (2) how can
we determine that his intention that nothing should be deducted from Simon's share,
was conditioned on the assumption that he
was not indebted, and that, had he realized
that Simon was indebted, he would have
directed the debt to be deducted. from his
share?
On the hypothesis that the will was
written after 1861, the reportof the auditor
would have to be corrected as indicated
below. On the contrary hypothesis, the
auditor's report would be accurate except
as respects interest on the advancements
to Thomas and Amos. As importanteonsequences depend on the date of the execution of the will, the report must be recommitted to the auditor in order that he
take such evidence as may be offered, upon
the date of execution.
Balance in executor's hands ........ $17,492.00
Advances...$1,700.00
1,349.00
-$3049.00
Ihterest for four
years on advances... 731.76
3780.76
$21,272.76
7,090.92

One-third ...................................
Simon's share ................. $7,090.92
Thomas' share, $7,090.92
1,672.76
5,418.16
Amos' share..... $7,090.92
2,108.00
-4,982.92

MAUD WATERS vs. SAMUEL IRVINGTON AND TRUSTEES OF DICKINSON COLLEGE.
Deed of trust-usband'spower of dis.7osition of personally-Fraud on marital
rights of wife- Voluntary gift-Revocation-Testamentaryprovision.
Bill in equity.
H. FRANKLIN KANTNER and CHAS. W.
HAMILTON for plaintiff.

I

1. The deed of trust is invalid, being
an attempt to prevent the wife from acquiring a share of the grantor's personalty
after his death.-Lonsdale's Estate, 29 Pa.
407; Hummel's Estate, 161 Pa. 215; Thayer
v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 104.
2. A voluntary gift is of no effect unless executed by the transfer of the property intended to be given, and by the delivery of the usual evidences of the title
to such property.-Withers v. Weaver, 10
Pa. 391; Trough's Estate, 75 Pa. 115;
Girard Trust Co. v. Mellor, 156 Pa. 583;
Appeal of Waynesboro College, 111 Pa.
130.
3. If a trust, it takes effect as a testamentary provision.-Turner v. Scott, 51
Pa. 132; Frederick's Appeal, 52 Pa. 338;
Frew v. Clark. 80 Pa. 170; Gingrich's Appeal, 1 Mona. 301.
SImioN P. NORTHRUP and WILLIS E.
MACKEY for the defendant.
A husband can dispose of his personalty
freed from any post mortem claim by his
widow.-Ellmaker v. Ellmaker, 4 Watts
91; Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. 285; Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 210; Lines v. Lines,
142 Pa. 149; Stone v. Hackett, 78 Mass.
227.
The deed of trust was not testamentary
in its character.-Mattocks v. Brown, 103
Pa. 16; Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 210;
Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149.
OPINION OF COURT.

Twenty years after his marriage with
Maud Harris, Joseph Waters, for some time
disaffected towards her and having ceased
to live with her, and with the intent to
prevent her acquiring any portion of his
personalty at his death, made a deed of
trust of his personal property, embracing
stocks, bonds, mortgages and judgments,
the gross value of which was $497,320, to
Samuel Irvington in trust, to allow him,
Waters, to receive the income, dividends,
interest,.etc., during his.life and after his
death to transfer the corpus to Dickinson
College. In this deed he stipulated that
he might revoke it at any time, and that
any sales, gifts, or transfers by himself
during life should be deemed a revocation
pro tanto, and that for the purpose of
making such sales, gifts, etc., Waters
should at all times have the right to the
possession of any certificates, mortgages,
bonds or other securities. Of this power to
sell he availed himself but once, selling
$40,000 of nonds and receiving and appropriating the price. Joseph Waters dying
six months after making the deed of trust,
without issue, his widow files this bill to
procure a decree that as to one-half of the
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personalty, the deed of trust is invalid.
The defendant demurs.
The validity of the deed of trust as to
Maud Waters is denied by the plaintiff
for reasons which we shall consider seriatim.
1. It is an attempt to prevent Maud
Waters from acquiring a share of the personalty of the grantor, should she survive
him.
The interest of a wife in her husband's
personalty differs from that in his realty.
The latter begins before death, and except
in special modes, e. g. the creation of
debts, on which the land may be sold
on execution, cannot be divested by the
act of the husband without her co-operation. In personalty she has no greater
interest until death than the husband's
next of kin. Any disposition, with an
exception to be hereafter noted, taking
effect dum vivus, will prevent the acquisition of an estate. Hence over such disposition she has no power. On surviving
her husband she cannot dispute its efficaciousness. Ellmaker v. Ellmaker, 4 W.
91; Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. 281; Lines
v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149; Dickerson's Appeal,
115 Pa. 198.
If the husband gives his personalty to
another, he must if sane, know that the
effect of the gift will be to prevent his
wife's acquiring a share of it. To do an
act with consciousness of the effect is to
intend the effect. It would seem to follow
from the cases just cited thata gift by the
husband even for the purpose of preventing the wife's gaining a share in the subject of it, would be valid as respects her.
We are conducted, however, by Himmel's
Estate, 161 Pa. 215, and Lonsdale's Estate,
29 Pa. 407, to the conclusion that a voluntary gift of property of which possession is
not gotten until death, for thepurpose of
preventing the wife's acquiring any interest, is voidable by her. -No case, "says
Sterrett, 0. J., "has gone so far as to sustain
a voluntary obligation given and received
with intent to defraud the wife's rights"
and by defrauding the wife's rights, is
meant preventing her gaining any proprietary interest in the property of her husband through the intestate law. As it is
admitted as if it were an allegation in the
bill, that Joseph Waters made the deed of
trust with the object of preventing his

wife gaining any portion of his estate, we
think it invalid as to her.
2. The deed is voluntary so far as the
college is concerned, and a second objection
to the gift is that it is not valid, until executed by a transfer of the subject of the
gift. The deed of trust was made and delivered. It would not have become inoperative, because the choses in action assigned were not delivered to the grantee.Bond v. Bunting, 78 Pa. 210. A deed of
assignment for the benefit of creditors, e.
g. operates, despite the retention of possession of the things assigned, by the assignor. Had the deed not been delivered, the
trust would not have taken effect, but the
mere non-delivery of the thing assigned
would not prevent the rise of the trust. A
voluntary bond, delivered, is enforceable,
though the money which is to satisfy it,
does not pass to the donee.-Hummel's Estate, 161 Pa. 215; Mack'sAppeal, 68 Pa. 231.
3. The reservation of a power of revocation, it is urged, makes the deed of trust
testamentary, and therefore it cannot prevail against the widow's claim to share in
the personalty covered by it.
The ownership passed to the trustee by
the deed on its delivery. It could be recalled, by a revocation, but until recalled,
it remains where the deed deposited it.
The revocableness of the deed during the
life of Joseph Waters, although making it
in a sense ambulatory did not give it the
character of a testament, Lines v. Lines,
142 Pa. 149; Dickerson's Appeal 115 Pa.
198; Mattocks v. Brown, 103 Pa. 16.
The demurrer is overruled and the defendant directed to answer.
ESTATE OF JOHN ROBERTS,
DECEASED.
Evidence- Will-Latent ambiguity-Auditor'sfinding of fact.
CLEON N. BERNTHEIZEL and JonN H.
VINCENT for the exceptants.
3. T. CALDWELL and EDWIN S. LIv-INGOOD for the auditor.

Paroltestimony may explain latent ambiguity. -Brownfield v. Brownfield, 12 Pa
136; loore's Estate, 6 Mont. 117; Dugan's
Estate, 24 W. N. C. 287; Wiltberger's Estate, 24 W. N. C. 493.
In case of latent ambiguity explanatory
declarations made by the testator at or
about the execution of the will are admis-
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sible; so are his previous professions indicative of a design to give his property in
a particular way.-Vernor v. Henry, 3
Watts 385; Brownfield v. Brownfield, 12
Pa. 136; Phelps' Estate, 7 Kulp 485- 2 Taylor on Evidence (7th ed.), 1009. beclarations need not be contemporaneous with
the making of the will.-I Jarman on
Wills, 756; Doe v. Allen, 12 Ad. & E. 227.
Finding of fact by an auditor must be
regarded as conclusive in the absence of
plain error.-Penn Bank's Estate, 152 Pa.
65.
OPINION OP THE COURT.
The will of John Roberts stated "I give
to Josiah Roberts, son of Josiah Roberts,
Jr., my gold watch. I also give to William
Roberts $500, and to Josiah Roberts $500."
Before the auditor who made the distribution of the estate, it was proven that the
testator had two brothers named Josiah
and William, each of whom had a son
bearing the same name. The brothers and
the nephews competitively claimed the
legacies. It was shown that the testator
had declared, one year after making the
will, that he had given legacies of $500 to
his nephews, and also that at, and for a
year prior to, the making of the will, he
had not been on speaking terms With his
brothers, while he was extremely fond of
his nephews. The auditor awarded the
legacies to the nephews, and the brothers
except.
There is perhaps a presumption that the
testator's affection for his brothers was
stronger than that for those who were one
degree remoter from him, viz., their sons,
and, had we no other evidence, this presumption would probably be sufficient to
require the award of the legacies to the
brothers. Turner's Estate, 18 Pa. C. C.
127. The evidence admitted rebuts and indeed reverses this presumption. It appears
that he was not on speaking terms with
hisbrothers whilehe was extremely fond of
his nephews. As the former or the latter
and not both were intended to be beneficiaries,we cannot doubt the accuracyof the decision of the auditor, the evidence being receivable. That the state of the testator's
property and his relations to relatives and
,others can be shown is a commonplace of
the law. If a legacy is given to a person
of a certain name and description and the
name and description equally suit two persons, parol evidence is admissible to determine which was meant.-Iddings v. Iddinds, 7 S. & R. 111; Vernon v. Henry, 3

W. 385; Brownfield v. Brownfield, 12 Pa.
136; Patch v. White, 117 U. S. 210 ; Byer's
Appeal, 98 Pa. 479. The degree of cordiality of the testator toward his relatives is
not ascertained by his declarations, but by
evidence altogether unexceptionable, and
would be sufficient, we think, apart from
the post-testamentary declaration of the
testator, to warrant the conclusion of the
auditor. It is a circumstane that the devisor distinguishes between Josiah Roberts,
Jr., and his son, Josiah Roberts, and gives
to Josiah Roberts described as son ofJosiah,
Jr., a gold watch; and also, though without
the description "son of Josiah Roberts,
Jr.," the $500. The nephew Josiah was
clearly the legatee of the watch.
But the declaration of the testator that
he had given $500 to his nephews was properly received. It tended to show to whom
he thought he had given thebequest. That
a year had elapsed since the making of the
will, can have significance only as making
possible his forgetfulness of its terms. As
it was presumably in his possession and he
was conscious of the power to modify it at
any time, the danger of mistake is negligible.-Doe v. Allen, 12 Ad. & Ell. 455; 1
Jarman on Wills,*438;Cf.Vernon v. Henry,
3 W. 385. We find it impossible to accept
the opinion in Jacobs' Estate, 9 Pa. C. C.
40, and Turner's Estate, 18 Pa. C. C. 127,
that such declarations are inadmissible.
The exceptions are dismissed and the
report of the auditor confirmed.
GEORGE HUGHES vs. HENRY
LIGHTNER.
Time of bringing action-Paper filedWaiver of objections-Titleat institutionof
action-Lease.
Ejectment.
H. W. SAVIDGE and THroAs K. LEIDY
for plaintiff.
1. The paper filed is an agreement, is
legal, valid, and bindin'g, and cannot be
repudiated.-Bunting v. Lutz, 132 Pa,
193; Ruggles v. Alexander, 2 Rawle 231;
Saeger v. Mead, 171 Pa. 349; Rea v. Gibbons, 7 S. & R. 203; Jobe v. Hunter, 165
Pa. 5; Woddrop v. Thacher, 117 Pa. 340;
Johnson v. Chaffont, 1 Binn. 75; Wilkins
v. Barr, 6 Binn. 389; Fursht v. Overdeen,
3 W. & S. 470; Heilner v. Battin, 27 Pa.
517.
2. After the death of Charles Hughes,
prior to the trial, the plaintiff has suffi-
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cient title to bring this action. There need
be no second action.-Act of April 13,
1807, P. & L. p. 1699; Ballatine v. Nagley,
158 Pa. 475; Grant v. Levan, 4 Pa. 420;
Webster v. Webster, 54 Pa. 161; Am. and
Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 6, p. 230.
•
3. The defendant was either a mere
trespasser or a tenant at sufferance and
cannot deny the title of the decedent or
the plaintiff in this action.-Wilhelm v.
Shoop, 6 Pa. 21; Losee v. McFarland, 86
Pa. 33; Evans v. Hastings, 9 Pa. 273.
4. The plaintiff can recover an undivided one-third, besides damages and
costs.-Act of April 8, 1833, P. & L. 2411;
Murry v. Garretson, 4 S. & R. 129.
H. CLAY BEISTEL and HORACE CODDINGTON for defendant.
1. There being no privity between Henry
Lightner and Louis Richards, the proper
deendant, plaintiff must suffer a nonsuit.
2. The plaintiff must recover upon the
strength of his title at the time of the institution of the action.-Alden v. Grove,
18 Pa. 377; McCulloch v. Cowher, 5 W. &
S. 427; Boyland v. Meeker, 28 N. J. L.
274. Plaintiff must have the present right
ofpossession.-Heffner v. Betz, 32 Pa. 376.
3. If plaintiff recovers at all, he can recover only an undivided third.-Butrick
v. Tilton, 141 Mass. 93; Mobley v. Brunner, 59 Pa. 481; Dawson v. Mills, 32 Pa.
302; Ash v. McGill, 6 Wh. 391; Wilne v.
Cummings, 4 Yeates 577; DePuy v. Strong,
37 N. Y. 372; Johnston v. Fullerton, 44
Pa. 466.
4. The filing of the paper before the
death of Charles Hughes does not preclude the defendant from taking advantage of the fact that the suit was improperly brought.
CHARGE OF COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury:
Hirons Hughes died intestate in 1894,
seized of a tract of land in fee. There survived him his father, Charles Hughes ; a
brother Jonathan ; two sons of a second
brother, Edward, deceased; the grandson,
George, of a third brother, William, who,
and whose only son, father of'George, had
died before Hirons ; and a half-brother, son
of his father by an earlier marriage. There
also survived Hirons, an uncle, Francis,
brother of his father; and an aunt, Sarah
Henderson, sister of his deceased mother.
Louis Richards, a tenant of Hirons
Hughes, under a lease for four years, which
had not expired when Hirons died, did not,
at its expiration, surrender possession, but
retained it through Henry Lightner.
Therefore George Hughes brought this
ejectment against Lightner four weeks before the death of Charles Hughes. A paper

has been filed to the effect that the P.xistence in life of Charles Hughes shall not
preclude a recovery if otherwise the plaintiff would be entitled to recover.
The defendant requests us to instruct you
(1) that there can be no recovery; (2) that
the plaintiff, if he can recover at all, cannot recover more than an undivided third.
Henry Lightner has no right to remain
in possession, other than that which grows
out of his present possession. Being there
he will be permitted to remain there until
some one whose right is superior attempts
to dispossess him.
Nor is it enough that at the time of trial,
the plaintiff should have a superior title.
If without right to possession when he
instituted the action, he will not be allowed
to eject the defendant by means of it, although he may between its inception and
conclusion have acquired this right.-Alden v. Grove, 18 Pa. 377; McCulloch v.
Cowher, 5 W. & S. 427.
When this action was begun, Charles
Hughes was alive. When Charles Hughes
died, his next of kin were his father, his
brother, the descendants of two deceased
brothers and a half-brother. His father became tenant for life.-Section 3, Act April
8th, 1833; 1 P. & L. 2410. The reversion
passed, one-third to the brother, Jonathan,
one other third to the two sons of Edward,
and the remaining third to George, the
plaintiff. The half-brother has no interest.
He would have inherited the land only in
default of the whole brothers and their issue
and also in default of the father.-Sec. 4,
5, Act April 8th, 1833; 1 P. & L. 2411.
Charles Hughes, therefore, the life tenant,
and not George Hughes, a reversioner,
had the right'of possession when the action
was initiated. The devolution of the right
of possession upon George a month thereafter does not discharge the action from the
vice of precipitancy.
But the agreement that a recovery may
be had, if the plaintiff might have recovered but for the existence of the life tenancy, waives the objection. Neither the title
nor the right of possession passed by this
agreement. These both had been in George
Hughes before it was filed. It is simply
a stipulation that the plaintiff shall not be
compelled to resort to another action, if he
is now, at the time of trial, entitled to the
possession.
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Hirons Hughes had, prior to his death,
leased the premises for four years to Louis
Richards. His death within the four years
did not, of course, terminate the lessee's
right to the possession. But, the lease expiring, the heir of the landlord became
entitled to the possession and could enforce
this right by ejectment. Henry Lightner
has no other right than that of Richards.
The first request of the defendant, therefore, we must deny, and we instruct you
that the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
With the second request of the defendant,
importing that the plaintiff can recover
only one undivided third, we comply. He
owns only an undivided third. He cannot
deprive the defendant of more than he
owns. He cannot vicariously recover the
shares of his. co-tenants.-Mobley v. Bruner, 59 Pa. 481; Dawson v. Mills, 32 Pa.
302.
As no facts are in dispute, we direct you
to render a verdict for the plaintiff for an
undivided one-third of the premises described in the writ.

ESTATE OF CHARLES FOX, DECEASED.
Will-Affect after AfarriageAct 8 Apr., 1833, inte~iareted.

1, 2, 15,

Exception to the Auditor's distribution.
FREDERICK C. MILLER and G. FRANK
WETZEL for exceptant.
Marriage and birth of issue work a revocation of a will previously made, when no
provisibn has been made for the widow and
issue. Act 8 Apr., 1833, 1P. & L. Dig. 1450;
Walker v. Hall, 34 Pa. 483; Edward's
Appeal, 47 Pa. 144; Robeno v. Marlatt,
136 Pa. 35; Wilson v. Ott, 160 Pa. 433. If
the wife alone is provided for, or the issue
alone, the will is inoperative. Walker v.
Hall, 34 Pa. 483; Edward's Appeal, 47 Pa.
144; Grosvenor v. Fogg, 81 Pa. 400; Robeno
v. Marlatt, 136 Pa. 35.
Widow of intestate receives one-third
and issue two-thirds.-Aet 8 Apr., 1833, 1
P. & L. Dig. 1450; Leinaweaver v. Stoever,
1 W. & S. 160; Heineman's Appeal, 92 Pa.
95.
MARTIN F.

DUFFY and CHARLES E.

DANIELS for the Auditor.
A widow is entitled to one-half of personalty absolutely when testator dies
without surviving children. 2 Act Apr.
8, 1833,' 1 P. & L.Dig. 2408-2409.
Widow may take under provision of
will, which is inoperative as to her only

when she elects to take against it.-Fidelity Trust Co.'s Appeal, 121 Pa. 1. The
intention of the testator must govern,Roberjot v. Mazurie, 14 S. & R. 42; Coates,
Appeal, 2 Pa. 135; Horwitz v. Norris, 60
Pa. 261; Sheetz's Appeal, 62 Pa. 213; Barclay v.Lewis, 67 Pa. 316.
The will is revoked in part as to the
residue of the estate, for the benefit of the
son.-Walker v. Hall, 34 Pa. 483; Willard's Appeal, 68 Pa. 327; Laird's Appeal,
85 Pa. 339.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Charles Fox, unmarried, made a will by
which he bequeathed his whole estate,
personalty dnly, to certain charities. He
however, added, "But, should I at any
time hereafter become married, I give to
my wife one-half of my estate." Six
months after making his will, Charles Fox
married, and three months after his death
a son was born. The auditor, appointed
to distribute the estate, has awarded onehalf to the widow and one-half to the son.
Counsel for the son except that as to him
the decedent died intestate.
Had Charles Fox died intestate, the son
would receive two-thirds, the widow onethird, of his estate. Sect. 1, 2, Act April
8, 1833; 1 P. & L. Dig. 2408, 2409.
The 15th section of the same act ordains
that "When any person shall make his
last will and testament and-afterwards
shall marry or have a child or children
not provided for in such will, and die,
leaving a widow and child

*

*

* -al-

though such child or children be born
after the death of their father, every such
person, so far as shall regard the widow,
or child or children after born, shall be
deemed and construed to die intestate;
and such widow, child or children shall
be entitled to such purparts, shares and
dividends of the estate, real and personal
of the deceased, as if he had actually died
without any will." 1 P. &. L. Dig. 1450.
As to the widow, this enactment operates, whenever the marriage occurs after
the making of the will, whether the will
does or does not make provision for her.
Fidelity Trust Co.'s Appeal, 121 Pa. 1.
But, the will is not annulled by it, even
as to her. It simply "entitles" her to
such purpart, share or dividend as if the
husband had died intestate. "If she does
not elect to make such claim, the will is
not affected in any respect." The will of
Charles Fox gives to his widow a larger
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share of his estate than would the intestate law. Of this larger share, the 15th
section of the Act of 1833, in so far as it
aims to declare the results, as to her, of a
post-testamentary marriage, does not deprive her. Fidelity Trust Co.'s Appeal,
supra. The dicta to the effect that the
subsequent marriageis ipsofacto arevocation kro tanto of the will, Edward's Appeal, 47 Pa. 144; Walker v. Hall, 34 Pa.
483, are inaccurate.
But, a son has been born after the death
of Charles Fox. This son is therefore "entitled to such purparts * * * as if he (the
testator) had actually died without any
will." As against the charities, his option
would be irresistible. Is it ineffectual as
against his mother? The import of the
statutory language is unmistakable. Such
child "shall be entitled to such purparts,"
etc. If the gift to the widow of one-half,
i. e., one-sixth more than under the intestate law she would be entitled to, were indefeasible by the son, so would be the gift
of the whole to her. The statute would
have been no protection to the son, as
against bequests or devises to the widow.
But it protects him as against her as well
as against all the world. A devise of all
the land of the decedent to the widow, is
as against the subsequently born son,
wholly inoperative. She takes only her
dower. Edward's Appeal, 47 Pa. 144;
Walker v. Hall, 34 Pa. 483; Robeno v.
Marlatt, 136 Pa. 35. There is no difference
between devises and bequests. The exception is sustained, the report. is recommitted to the auditor, and he is directed
to award to the exceptant two-thirds of
the fund.
FREDERICK ORMSBY vs. IRA D.

PEPPER.

Devise-Trust-Merger of
Title by Sheriff's Sale.

Interests-

Ejectment.
ROBERT H. BARKER and HERMAN H.
GRISwOLD for the plaintiff.
The trust is void. Legal and equitable
titles merge in Ira D. Pepper.-Hahn v.
Hutchinson, 159 Pa. 133; Ehrisman v.
Sener, 162 Pa. 577.
The general power of disposal expressed
in the will vested a fee simple in Ira D.
Pepper.-Good v. Fichthorn, 144 Pa. 287;
Evans v. Smith, 166 Pa. 625; Kiefel v.

Keppler, 173 Pa. 181; Ahl v. Bosler, 175
Pa. 527. The devise over to children is
therefore void.-Karker's Appeal, 60 Pa.
155; Jauretche v. Proctor, 48 Pa. 466;
Evans v. Smith, 166 Pa. 625.
J. HARRIS WILLIAM S and HUGH R.
MILLER for the defendant.
The wife intended her husband to take
a life estate.-Meyer's Appeal, 48 Pa. 26;
Rife v. Geyer, 59 Pa. 393; Lininger's Appeal, 110 Pa. 398; Mercur's Estate, 151 Pa.
49; Hahn v. Hutchinson, 159 Pa. 133;
Kennedy v. Kennedy, 159 Pa. 327; Smith
v. Snow, 123 Mass. 323.
At the sheriff's sale, the plaintiff purchased only an estate for the life of the
husband, which having expired, leaves
no title in Ormsby.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury:
Mary Pepper's will contained the clause,
"I devise my farm to my husband, Ira D.
Pepper, in trust that he shall manage and
control it as he shall think best, so that
neither it nor the rents and income thereof,
shall be subject to any debts that he may
contract, but the same shall be his absolutely. And as said trustee, my husband
may sell any portion, or all of the said
farm, encumber it and make whatever use
he chooses of the proceeds. He may also,
at his death, devise the said farm if he
shall not have otherwise disposed of it, to
whomsoever he shall choose. At the
death of my husband, and subject to the
exercise by him of the powers and rights
heretofore conferred upon him, I devise one
undivided third to my son John, one to
my son James, and one to my daughter
Ellen."
Ira D. died in July, 1896, having survived his wife twenty years. In
1891 ajudgment was recovered against him
by Frederick Ormsby for money loaned on
a bond, and on a ft. fa. and vend. ex. his
interest in the farm was sold in 1894 by
the sheriff to Ormsby. Six months after
the acknowledgment and delivery of the
sheriff's deed, Ormsby began this ejectment, in which the original defendant's
son, Ira D., has been substituted as defendant.
It is conceded by the defendant, that
the trust for Ira D. Pepper, created by the
will of Mary Pepper, was invalid. He was
the trustee and also the cestui que trust.
The two interests merged. The object of
their separation, viz: to exempt the proceeds, or the corpus from liability for debts
of Ira D. Pepper, is disapproved by the
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courts, and a trust in one for himself,
with this object is treated as null. Hahn v,.
Hutchinson, 159 Pa. 133; Ehrisman v.
Sener, 162 Pa. 577. Despite the testamentary direction that neither the land nor its
income shall be subject to debts contracted
by Pepper, on the judgment recovered
against him a valid sheriff's sale could
take place. The sale to Ormsby is unimpeachable.
In ejectment, the plaintiff can recover,
only if, both when he began the action he
was, and at the trial he is, the owner of the
land with a right to the possession.
This ejectment was brought during the
life of Ira D. Pepper, the devisee of Mary
Pepper. He has since died, his son by a
former marriage, who is in possession being substituted for him as defendant. If
Ormsby acquired by the sheriff's sale only
an estate per autre bvie., as that estate has
become extinct he no longer has a right to
the possession of the premises. On the
other hand, if he acquired a fee, nothing
has happened to preclude his present recovery of the land. We must then ascertain what quantity of estate passed to him.
As he gained by his purchase whatever
estate Ira D. Pepper had, what quantity of
estate was devised to Pepper?
The devise is to Ira D. Pepper. The land,
and its rents and income, are to be his
"absolutely." He may sellitorencumber
it, and make any use he chooses of the
proceeds. He may devise it, if before his
death he has not disposed of it. The
devise to Ira, unqualified, would transfer
a fee. The addition of the powers to sell,
dum vivus, and to devise, does ndt
diminish the estate which without it,
would have been given. Ahl v. Bosler,
175 Pa. 526; Good v. Fichthorn, 144 Pa.
287; Evans v. Smith, 166 Pa 625. The gift
to a husband of an unlimited power to sell
and to dispose of the proceeds, following
a gift of the "wholeincome while helives"
there being no devise over, indicates that a
fee is intended to vest in him. "Such an
estate," says Mitchell J. "is very near a
fee simple. The difference is purely tech,nical, and is not one which would be
obvious to the ordinary mind." Kiefel v.
Keppler, 173 Pa. 181.
What effect are we to impute to the devise over, in Mfary Pepper's will? Her
language is: "At the death of my husband

and subject to the exercise by him of the
powers and rights heretofore conferred
upon him, I devise one undivided third
to my son John," etc. This is not an absolute devise over, but contingent on the
non-exercise of the power to convert the
land to his sole use, by her husband. We
do not think it sufficient to justify the inference that only a life estate was conferred
on him. A direction to him to devise to
John would not have had this effect. Ahl
v. Bosler supra; Good v. Fichthorn, 144
Pa. 287. We are unable to give a larger operation to a direct devise by the testator,
contingent on the non-sale and non-devise
by the immediate devisee. Of. Evans v.
Smith, 166 Pa. 625; Jauretche v. Proctor,
48 Pa. 466. A fee therefore passed by the
devise to Ira D. Pepper. [In Hahn v.
Hutchinson, 159 Pa. 133, the court refrains
from deciding whether a fee or a life estate
passed by the will.]
But, we do not think the estate of Ormsby is admeasured by that of Ira.D. Pepper.
To Pepper, even if a fee was not given by
his wife's will, a power to dispose of a fee
was given. He may sell the farm; he
may encumber it, he may use in any way
the proceeds. Evidently, then, a total
alienation of the farm was within the
scope of his power. To no pa.rticular form
of incumbrance is the power to incumber
limited. It may be by mortgage, or by
judgment. The power to encumber, implies the power to expose to a sheriff's sale
of the fee, in order to realize the money
with which the farm may be encumbered.
Ira D. Pepper has contracted a debt, has
suffered the recovery of a judgment, and
has suffered a sale on that judgment.
Even if he had not himself a fee, the
sheriff's vendee at a sale founded on the
incumbrance, gains a fee. Ormsby is
therefore, entitled to the verdict of the
jury.
JOHN SULVIERSON vs RICHARD
EVERETT.
Sale--Conditionalsale-Bailment.
Issue under sheriff's interpleader.
GRIER B. SNYDER and I. I. WINGERT
for plaintiff.
The contract in question is simply a
lease. The piano remained in bailment,
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and therefore the title did not pass to the
defendant.-Clark v. Jackson, 7 Watts 375;
Rose v. Story, 1 Pa. 190; Chamberlain v.
Schmidt, 44 Pa. 431; Werts v. Collunder
Co., 20 W. N. C. 59; Rowe v. Sharp, 51
Pa. 26; Crist v. Kleber, 79 Pa. 290; Enlow
v. Kline, 79 Pa. 488; Edwards v. Ward,
105 Pa. 103; Ditman v. Coterell, 125 Pa.
606; Hamilton v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76.
A. A. WINGERT and A. S. SHOENER for
defendant.
The agreement was essentially one of
sale and not of bailment. The title therefore passed to the defendant and the piano
can be levied upon for his debts. Simon
v. Edmundson, 10 Pa. C. C. 315; McClure
v. Forney, 107 Pa. 414; Forrest v. Nelson,
108 Pa. 481; Peek v. Heim, 127 Pa. 500;
Renninger v. Spatz, 128 Pa. 324; Stephens
v. Gifford, 137 Pa. 219; Farquhar v. MeAlevy, 142 Pa. 233; Ott v. Sweatman, 166
Pa. 217.
CHARGE OF COURT.
Gentlemen of the Jurjj:
Summerson, a piano manufacturer, made
on Aug. 11, 1894, the following contract:
"This attests that Adam Reymer has today hired . piano from John Summerson.
The value of the piano is $700. Reymer
agrees to pay Summerson in seven monthly
instalments i. e. $100 per month, as rent
for the same. Should any instalment not
be paid for three days after it falls due
Summerson may take the piano into his
own possession, and this lease thereof shall
thereupon come to an end, and no instalments already paid shall be paid back to
Reymer, and Reymer shall remain liable
to an action at law for all such instalments
as shall have become due and be unpaid,
when the said Summerson resumes possession of the piano. When the last of the
said seven instalments shall have been
paid, Summerson shall execute a bill of
sale to Reymer for the piano, which from
and ever after the said last payment shall
become and remain the sole property of
Reymer."
Four instalments were duly paid, but
the fifth was never paid. Summerson did
not exercise his right to retake the piano,
but allowed it to remain with Reymer.
Three weeks after the fifth instalment became due, Richard Everett, who had obtained a judgment against Reymer, issued
an execution thereupon, and caused the
sheriff to levy on the piano; as Reymer's.
This feigned issue is to determine whose is
the piano.
The owner of a chattel may loan it to

another, for hire, or not for hire, without
exposing it to the risk of being levied upon
as the borrower's. On the other hand, a
contract to sell a chattel with delivery of
possession of it to the purchaser, makes it
as the purchaser's, liable to seizure for his
debts, despite a stipulation that the vendor
shall retain a lien on it, or-substantially
the same thing-tbat the ownership shall
not pass to the purchaser until the completion of the payment of the price. Ott
v. Sweatman 166 Pa. 217.
In order to evade the last principle, it
has become common for vendors to attempt to give to a contract primarily for
sale, the semblance of a lease; to distribute
the purchase money into instalments called
rent, payable over a certain time; to declare that until the payment of the instalments, the subject of the contract though
in the possession of the other party, shall
remain the so-called lessor's; and to provide for the transmutation of the ownership when the last instalment shall have
been paid. In some cases, the parties
have succeeded in inducing the courts to
give larger prominence to the element of
bailment than to that of sale; in others;
the court, thinking the former but a disguise for the latter, have determined the
rights of creditors of the bailee, by the
element of sale in the contract. It would
-e useless to attempt to reduce these cases
to any common principle. To profess that
they are capable of harmonization implies
a lack of candor or of discrimination. We
think however that the more recent eases
hold that when the primary object of the
parties is to effect a sale, and the form of
bailment is intermediately adopted, in
order to secure the vendor for the price,
the thing, in the Possession of the baileevendee, shall be deemed his, as respects
creditors of or purchasers from him. We
also think that the interpretation of the
contract of Summerson and Reymer,
which these cases warrant will make it
primarily one of sale.
Seven hundred dollars, the "value" of
the piano are at all events to be paid by
Reymer, in $100 instalments. If any of
these is unpaid, Summerson may recover
possession of the piano. But, such resumption does not excuse from the payment of the remaining instalments; even
though they fall due after the cessation of
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Reymer's possession. When the last instalment is paid, the piano is to become
4nd remain the sole property of Reymer.
It is impossible not to see that the contract
was one of sale. The instalments are not
a rent, but fractional payments of the
price. The duty of paying them is
not consequent on the monthly possession, but is absolute; continuing even
when the possession is lost. What avails
it that the word I hired" and 'Ilease" are
used? and that there is a stipulation for
a bill of sale after the completion of the
payment of the $700? Ott v. Sweatman,
166 Pa. 217; Farquhar v. McAlevy, 142 Pa.
233. We are of opinion that the piano
was so far the property of Reymer, as to
be leviable for his debt. Your verdict
therefore, should be for the defendant.

JOSIAH HUIVPHREYS vs. EMILY
GRAFT.
IN THE SUPREME COURT.
Gift -Donor's intention--esultingTrust
-Trustee's purchase- Title.
Emily Graft, wife of William Graft, was
the daughter of Josiah Humphreys. Win.
Graft contemplated buying a house for
$2000 and a lot, and, as a gift to his daughter, Humphreys contributed $1000, expecting the deed to be made to Win. Graft and
Emily Graft. Itwas in fact, at the instance
of Win. Graft, made to him as sole grantee.
Humphreys then insisted that Win. Graft
should give him ajudgment note for $1000
to secure the money he had put into the
purchase for his daughter, and the note
was given. Before judgment was entered
on it, Graft made a written contract to sell
the house to Amos Farrer for $3000, of
which $350 was paid down. Learning of
this, Humphreys caused a judgment to be
entered for $1000, issued execution, and at
the sheriff sale of Win. Graft's interest in
the property, became the purchaser for
$1200. Becoming thus the owner of Win.
Graft's right, Humphreys compelled Farrer to pay him $2650, the remainder of
the price he had agreed to pay. Emily
Graft, insisting that this sum less $200, the
amount paid to the sheriff by Humphreys,
is her property, sues the latter for $2450.
The court was asked by the counsel for
the defendant to instruct the jury that undier the evidence there could be no recovery
by the plaintiff. This the court refused to
do, and instead advised the jury that their
verdict should be for the plaintiff for the
amount claimed.
Before FISHER, P. J., Boyi and HENNINGER, J. J.

Appeal by defendant.
-Errorassigned, direction of the court below.
JOSEPH F. BIDDLE and PAUL H. PRICE
for appellant.
The intention of the donor must be ascertained and complied with in order that
the gift may be fully executed.-8 Am. &
Eng. Ency. of Law, 1336; Mulock v. Mulock, 31 N. J. Eq. 602; Doty v. Willson, 47
N. Y. 580.
The gift, containing a condition and not
being complied with- reverted to the donor.
-Jacobs v. Jacobs, 1 Mo. 277.
Thejudgment note was not held in trust,
for thewords relied upon must be unequivocal and the relation between parent and
child in sueh cases mustbe taken into consideration.-Young v. Young, 80N. Y. 424;
Harris v. Richey; 56 Pa. 395; Poorman v.
Kilgore, 26 Pa. 372.
H. CLAY BEISTEL and HUGH R. MIT,
LE

for appellee.

The gift, being executed, is irrevocable.
-8 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1318; 3
Pomeroy Equity, 1149; Clough v. Clough,
117 Mass. 83.
A resulting trust arises where the husband invests the money of his wife and
takes the title to himself. Light v. Zeller,
144 Pa. 570; Young v. Senft, 153 Pa. 352;
Rupp's Appeal, 100 Pa. 531.
A purchase by a trustee at his own sale
must be considered for the benefit of the
ce.xtui ue trust.-Sourwine v. Claypool,
138 Pa. 126; Parshall's Appeal, 64 Pa. 299;
Cadwalader's Appeal, 65 Pa. 224.
OPINION OF COURT.

Josiah Humphreys, father of Emily
Graft, contributed$1,000 toward the $2,000,
the price of land about to be purchased by
William Graft, husband of Emily, in expectation that the deed should name William and Emily as grantees. The money
was paid to the vendor, but the deed
named William Graft as sole grantee. A
trust thus resulted, as to an undivided
half of the land. See 12 Am. & Eng. Ency.
of Law, 15; Rupp's Appeal, 100 Pa. 431.
To whom did it result? To Josiah Humphreys or to Emily Graft? Had Josiah
Humphreys intended that he should be
named as grantee the trust would have
been for him. Authority is superfluous
for so unquestionable a proposition.
But, the $1000 was contributed by Humphreys for his daughter, and with the intention that the deed should name her as
a co-grantee with William Graft. When
it was actually applied by the latter to
the purchase, the gift to Emily was at
once executed. The money was no longer
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Humphreys', it was not in his possession.
It had became the vendor's. Instead of
it, was an interest in the land, legal, in
William; equitable in Emily. Josiah
Humphreys had no estate either in the
money by which the land was procured,
nor in the land itself.
The legal title to the land was in William Graft. He had therefore the power
to dispose of it to a purchaser for value,
ignorant of the trust ior his wife, and thus
to imperil the interest which her father
had intended her to have. The latter insisted on obtaining from William Graft a
note for $1,000, with warrant to confess
judgment, so that he could recover for her,
that amount in case of need. Wm. Graft
need not have given this note. The land was
his and Emily's. Should it be lost by his
conveyance, or for his debts, he would owe
her, not her father. The father must be
regarded then, as obtaining the note for
her.
Humphreys' fears of Graft's alienation
of the land were not groundless. Graft
contracted to convey it to Amos Farrer
for$3,000. Of this suni $350 was paid down.
Humphreys, learning of the sale, entered
judgment upon the note, and issuing execution, sold William Graft's interest in
the land for $1,200, becoming the purchaser. In this way Humphreys acquired
Wim. Graft's right to obtain from Farrer
the, as yet, unpaid purchase money, and
this sun was subsequently paid him by
Farrer, viz: $2,650. In this action Emily
Graft insists that Humphreys must pay
her the $2,650 received from Farrer, less
the $200 in excemss of the judgment on
which the sale took place, which Humphreys was compelled to pay the sheriff.
Humphreys had constituted himself a
trustee or attorney in fact of his daughter,
in taking the judgment from William
Graft. He would have fulfilled his duty

had he caused the sheriff's sale and allowed
the land to be bought by another. He
was under no obligation to bid more than
the judgment in order to secure the land
for his daughter. Unless in bidding the
$1,200 he intended to present the product
of the bid to her, the trust must be limited
to the product of the $1,000. For $1,200
he gets a right that produces $2,650, that
is, the $1,000 held by him as trustee and
which he applied to his bid, produced fivesixths, and the $200 which he paid in addition, produced one-sixth of the $2,650.
For the $1,000 and its product, he is a
trustee. For the $200 and its product, he
is not a trustee. We think he is in equity
liable therefore to pay to Emily Graft
only $2,208.33. Cf. 12 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
Law, 36; Rupp's Appeal, 100 Pa. 531.
In Sourwine v. Claypool, 138 Pa. 126,
the father did not bid at the sheriffs sale
more than the judgment. The judgment
was for $400. The purchase money owing
by the vendee of Sourwine was $900. The
father received this amount, $900, from the
vendee, and "after paying his bid at the
sheriff's sale and the expenses of litigation," there remained in his hands $600
(p. 127). His bid must then have been
less than $300. The right to the $000 was
purchased altogether by the judgment.
As the judgment was the property of his
daughter, held by him as quasi-trustee,
the right which was bought by it at
sheriff's sale, viz, the right to the $900, was
also the property of the daughter.
While therefore we think that the court
below was right in declining to instruct
the jury, as it was requested to do by the
defendant, that there could be no recovery
by the plaintiff, we think there was error
in advising the jury that their verdict
should be for the plaintiff for $2,450.
Judgment modified, into a judgment
for the plaintiff for the sum of $2,208.33.

H. SILAS STUART, A. M.

H. Silas Stuart was born in Cumberland
County, Pa., in 1855. Graduating from Princeton College, with honors, in the class of '77, he
spent the following two years in Europe at the
t iversities of Edinburg and Leipsic, pursuing
with other studies a course in Roman Law. In
both Universities, he stood in the highest of the
series, among which the students were distributed according to their success. He was admitted to the bar of his native county in 1881,
and two years later to the Supreme Court. Appointed a member of the examining board of the
bar, soon after his own admission, he still retains that office. In 1891, he was elected professor of the Law of Partnership, the duties of
which position he has since discharged with
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